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PROPOSALS FOR PROGRESS: SODOMY
LAWS AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Moral people, as they are termed, are simply beasts. I would
sooner have fifty unnatural vices, than one unnatural virtue.
It is unnatural virtue that makes the world, for those who
suffer, such a premature Hell.*
INTRODUCTION
While both heterosexual and homosexual' people may
often be prosecuted for consensual sodomy, these laws
disproportionately affect the lives of gay and lesbian people,2
often providing the justification for other discrimination, in-
cluding employment, child custody, and housing.3 Even unen-
forced sodomy laws permit the government to use the law as a
weapon against gay and lesbian persons.' Despite the modera-
* Letter from Oscar Wilde (1897), quoted in JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING OUT:
HOMOSEXUAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN, FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRES-
ENT 33 (1977). In 1895, after Wilde was convicted of committing "indecent" acts in
private with other men, he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. THE THREE
TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE 85 (H. Montgomery Hyde ed., 1956) (examining the crimi-
nal proceedings against and the conviction of Oscar Vrlde).
1. Some lesbian women and gay men may find the word "homosexual" objec-
tionable due to its stigmatized association with mental disease. See VERN L.
BULLOUGH & BONNIE BULLOUGH, SIN, SICKNESS, AND SANITY: A HISTORY OF SEXU-
AL ATIITUDES 197-212 (1977) (describing the interaction between the medical label-
ing and the stigmatization of homosexuality). However, since the European judicial
system relies solely upon the word "homosexual" in its documents, the use of the
word "homosexual" is appropriate when referring to these documents. Nevertheless,
where possible, the words "homosexual," "lesbian," and "gay" are used as adjec-
tives, rather than as nouns, to avoid reducing the identities of a significant popu-
lation of women and men to their sexual acts and attractions.
2. David A. Catania, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Sod-
omy Laws: A Federal Common Law Right to Privacy for Homosexuals Based on
Customary International Law, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 292 (1994).
3. See EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW 11 n.10 (1989).
4. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW
49-62 (1988). Many have argued that sodomy laws "effectively criminalize the
'status' of being a homosexual" since not all homosexual persons are sexually ac-
tive, yet unenforced sodomy laws often continue to adversely affect them. Cath-
erine E. Blackburn, Comment, Human Rights in an International Context: Recog-
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tion of both penalties and enforcement, the threat and stigma'
of sodomy laws still continue.
Sodomy laws must be challenged and invalidated in order
to lay the groundwork for attaining equal rights for lesbian
and gay people. Professor Mohr observed the paradox in aspir-
ing to secure gay rights while sodomy laws are still enforced:
"[a]s an invisible minority, gays cannot fight for the right to be
open about being gay, unless gays are already open about it;
and gays cannot reasonably be open about being gay, until
gays have the right to be openly gay."
While many legal systems have invalidated their sodomy
laws,' the United States Supreme Court continues to lag be-
hind since upholding Georgia's sodomy statute in 1986.8 Re-
nizing the Right of Intimate Association, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 143, 152 (1982).
5. Even if sodomy laws are not regularly enforced, their existence can signifi-
cantly influence both societal attitudes towards homosexual persons, as well as the
self-images of lesbian and gay persons themselves. See David A.J. Richards, Sexual
Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights
and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1006-09 (1979). For a dis-
cussion of the effects of laws which attempt to enforce the state's perception of
sexual morality, see H.LA. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 22 (1966). Addi-
tionally, the actual existence of sodomy laws can influence the way judges apply
the laws in general. See MOHR, supra note 4, at 55-56. For a discussion of how
sodomy laws can affect decisions under United States immigration law, see
Shannon Minter, Note, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigra-
tion Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INTL L.J. 771 (1993).
6. MOHR, supra note 4, at 187.
7. Although at one time, all states in the United States prohibited sodomy,
currently, sodomy laws remain on the books in twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia. EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 3, at 9. Further-
more, Bermuda, Estonia, Ireland, the Isle of Man, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, and
Ukraine have all invalidated their sodomy laws within the last three years.
Moldova has Legalised Homosexuality, July, 1995, available in >gopher://.seta.fi;
Julie Doff, Gay Activists: Think Globally, Act Globally, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 26,
1994, at A31, A32; Tony Faragher & John Arlidge, Manx MPs Vote to Legalise
Homosexuality, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 1, 1992, at 2. In the Isle of Man,
twenty-one men were arrested in February, 1992 for participating in sexual acts in
a public lavatory. Id. Sadly, one man, a divorcee and father, was found dead in
his fume-filled car shortly after he appeared in court. Id. The vote to abolish the
sodomy law came two days before twenty men were to appear in court, charged
with gross indecency. Id.
8. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (consensual homosexual behavior
does not fall within the protection of the United States Supreme Court's previous-
ly-articulated right to privacy). For a comparison of Bowers and the sodomy chal-
lenges in the European human rights legal system, see Jennifer F. Kimble, Note,
A Comparative Analysis of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom and Bowers v. Hardwick,
5 ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 200 (1988); see also Markus D. Dubber, Note, Homo-
sexual Privacy Rights Before the United States Supreme Court and the European
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cently, the United Nations Human Rights Committee9 ruled
sodomy statutes violate the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights." Further, the European Court of Human
Rights (Court) has repeatedly ruled that statutes criminalizing
private, consensual homosexual activity between adult men
violate the European Convention for the Protection of Funda-
mental Freedoms and Human Rights (Convention), namely
Article 8," which protects the individual's right to privacy.
This Note will critique the Court's use of the right to pri-
vacy in invalidating sodomy statutes. 2 While the decriminal-
ization of sodomy is a significant progressive step, the Court's
use and understanding of Article 8 is flawed and ineffective in
achieving for lesbian women and gay men the fundamental
freedoms and human rights that the Convention aims to pro-
tect and maintain. 3
Part I will explore the background and history of sodomy
laws and describe the mandated guarantees under the Conven-
tion. Part II will analyze the change in treatment of sodomy
laws under the Convention: initially being upheld and justified
under the Convention; then later being deemed to violate the
Convention's guaranteed right to privacy. Part III will examine
Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of Methodologies, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 189
(1990).
9. Article 28(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
establishes the Human Rights Committee to implement the Covenant's functions.
DomNIC McGOLDRICK, THE HuMAN RIGHTS COMMITEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 44
(1991).
10. The United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled that a sodomy law in
Tasmania, the smallest state in Australia, violated Articles 2 and 26 of the Cove-
nant, to which Australia is a signatory. See Int'l Law Notes, 1994 LESBIAN & GAY
L. NOTES 49, 56. For a discussion of the need for the United States judicial sys-
tem to reexamine Bowers in light of the Human Rights Committee's decision, see
Brenda Sue Thornton, The New International Jurisprudence on the Right to Priva-
cy: A Head-On Collision With Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALE. L. REV. 725 (1995).
See also Laurence R. Heifer & Alice Miller, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation:
Developments in the United Nations, the United States and Around the World, 9
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript, on file with the author)-(dis-
cussing the potential impact of the Human Rights Committee's decision on the
global litigation and lobbying efforts for lesbian and gay rights).
11. See infra text accompanying note 45 for the text of Article 8.
12. Unless otherwise noted, this Note will imply consensual sexual acts when
analyzing sodomy statutes.
13. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS-COLLECTED TEXTS 4 (1987)
[hereinafter COLLECTED TEXTS].
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the enduring anti-gay discrimination in the Council of Eu-
rope 4 (Council) and demonstrate how the Convention has
failed to fully protect lesbian and gay persons even after the
invalidation of sodomy laws. Lastly, in Part IV, this Note will
advance alternative methods for the European human rights
legal system to use to invalidate sodomy statutes, as well as
many other discriminatory restrictions on the lives of lesbian
and gay persons, which will help to ensure the equal treatment
and application of the Convention to lesbian women and gay
men in the member states. 5
I. SODOMY LAWS AND THE CONVENTION
A. History of Sodomy Laws
The word "sodomy" is derived from the Old Testament
story in which the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were once
believed to have been destroyed because of "rampant" homosex-
uality. 6 Sodomy laws typically prohibit "copulation with a
14. The 36-nation Council of Europe strives to promote democracy and human
rights. All the states in Western Europe are members. PETER TATCHELL, OUT IN
EUROPE: A GUIDE TO LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN 30 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 9
(1990); D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES 9 (5th ed. 1991). Over the last three years, several Eastern European
states have become members of the Council, while five others have applied and
are currently awaiting membership. See infra note 40. Although two member
states of the Council of Europe have not yet signed or ratified the Convention, the
author refers to the entire Council since all members are obliged to eventually
conform their laws with the mandates of the Convention. The term "member
states" refers to the 33 ratifying parties of the Convention. See infra note 40.
15. The alternatives proposed in this Note are based upon rights which have
already been incorporated into the Convention and upon prior case-law of the
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights. Urging improved protection against sexual orientation discrimination, other
authors have advocated new protocols to the Convention aiming to specifically
condemn such discrimination. See, e.g., ERIC HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HU-
MAN RIGHT 291-303 (1995) (proposing a Model Declaration of Rights Against Dis-
crimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation); Laurence R. Heifer, Lesbian and
Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies for a United Europe, 32 VA. J. INTL L.
157 (1991-92) (advocating either enhanced Article 14 anti-discrimination protection
of all rights or the creation of a new protocol aimed at prohibiting anti-gay dis-
crimination of all rights already guaranteed in the Convention); Daniel J. Kane,
Note, Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: What
Rights?, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 447 (1988) (proposing the establish-
ment of sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom).
16. Genesis 18:20-19:29. However, it is now widely accepted by many biblical
scholars that the sin committed by Sodom and Gomorrah was actually inhospitali-
ty to strangers. Edward Tivnan, Homosexuals and the Churches, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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member of the same sex or with an animal."'7 With their his-
tory in the Old Testament, and in certain limited definitions of
"natural" sexual behavior," sodomy laws continue to
criminalize the intimate acts of millions of people performed in
the privacy of their homes. 9
In Roman Europe, criminal sanctions were first estab-
lished as punishment for male-male sexual relations."0 After
the fall of the empire, prohibitions for homosexual activity
shifted to the religious domain.2 However, during the Middle
Ages, in Christian Europe, secular governments once again
assumed a more significant role in condemning homosexual
activity with the enactment and enforcement of criminal sod-
omy laws in several European states.' Yet, until the thir-
teenth century, tribal and common law treated sexual crimes
11, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 84, 89. For an assessment of the different interpreta-
tions of the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, see JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIAN-
rry, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 92-98
(1980).
17. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1120 (1986). However,
other definitions do not distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy.
For instance, one definition is "carnal copulation by human beings with each other
against nature, or with a beast." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (5th ed. 1979).
Other definitions rely principally on the occurrence of penile penetration such as:
"the penetration of the male organ into the mouth or anus of another." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2165 (1981).
18. "Intercourse is supposed to be natural and in it a man and a woman are
supposed to show and do what each is by nature.... Society makes laws that
say who will put what where when; and though folks keep getting it wrong, law
helps nature out by punishing those who are not natural enough. . . ." ANDREA
DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 149 (1987); see also BOSWELL, supra note 16, at 303-32
(examining the origins of the "nature" arguments condemning homosexuality);
BULLOUGH & BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 24-40 (describing the "nature" argument
against sodomy).
19. Some punishments seem incredibly cruel. For instance, in Iran, a fourth
offense for same-sex sodomy warrants the death penalty, while in China, convicted
sodomists receive sexual orientation altering therapy, including electroshock treat-
ment. Dorf, supra note 7, at A32; see also HEINZE, supra note 15, at 3-9 (describ-
ing reported incidents of violence and discrimination against lesbian and gay per-
sons).
20. For a discussion of how Roman law treated homosexual sodomy, see MI-
CHAEL GOODICH, THE UNMENTIONABLE VICE 75-77 (1979); see also HOMOSEXUALITY:
DISCRIMINATION, CRIMINOLOGY, AND THE LAW viii (Wayne R. Dynes & Stephen
Donaldson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CRIMINOLOGY AND LAW].
21. CRIMINOLOGY AND LAW, supra note 20, at viii. For a thorough examination
of the church's treatment of homosexuality, see GOODICH, supra note 20, at 3-70.
22. CRIMINOLOGY AND LAW, supra note 20, at viii-ix.
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relatively leniently, often imposing fines rather than capital
punishment.' However, beginning in the thirteenth century,
society once again began to view sodomy as a sin comparable
to homicide deserving of the greatest dishonor and shame.24
While lesbian sexual activity was never explicitly a crimi-
nal offense,' male homosexual relations were completely pro-
hibited in the United Kingdom by the Sexual Offenses Act of
1956 (Act).26 In 1967, the Act was amended to decriminalize
"private" homosexual activity between men over twenty-one-
years old,27 in response to the recommendations of the report
23. GOODICH, supra note 20, at 71; see also BOSWELL, supra note 16, at 169-
266 (providing a detailed account of society's relative tolerance for homosexuality
until the thirteenth century).
24. GOODICH, supra note 20, at 71; BOSWELL, supra note 16, at 276-302 (re-
counting society's tougher proscriptions against homosexuality beginning in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries).
25. Although women who participated in same-sex sexual activity were ridi-
culed and often harassed, lesbian sexual activity was usually considered a less
serious offense than male-defined sodomy. See Theo van der Meer, Tribades on
Trial: Female Same-Sex Offenders in Late Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam, in FOR-
BIDDEN HISTORY: THE STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY IN
MODERN EUROPE 189, 201-02 (John C. Fout ed., 1992). For instance, during the
eighteenth century in the Netherlands, women represented only five percent of the
persons prosecuted for same-sex acts; while the average penalty for men was
twelve years' imprisonment, the average punishment for women was six years and
was always reduced. Id. at 190, 202. Furthermore, in London, sexual relations
between women were never prosecuted. Randolph Trumbach, Sex, Gender, and
Sexual Identity in Modern Culture: Male Sodomy and Female Prostitution in En-
lightenment London, in FORBIDDEN HISTORY: THE STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE REGU-
LATION OF SEXUALITY IN MODERN EUROPE 89, 94 (John C. Fout ed., 1992). Indeed,
it has been reported that when Queen Victoria signed the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act of 1885 which originally sought to enforce penalties for both female and
male homosexual conduct, she deleted all references to lesbianism since she be-
lieved that lesbians simply did not exist. Renee Graham, An Overdue Addition to
Lesbian History, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1, 1993, at 64.
26. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 29; see also Sexual Offenses Act, 1956, 4 & 5
Eliz. 2, ch. 69, § 12 (Eng.). See generally BETWEEN THE ACTS: LivEs OF HOMOSEX-
UAL MEN 1885-1967 (Kevin Porter & Jeffirey Weeks eds., 1991) (interviews of gay
men describing their lives when homosexual behavior was completely illegal in
Britain).
27. Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, ch. 60, § 1 (Eng.). The Act states the following:
"a homosexual act in private is not an offence provided that the parties consent to
it and have attained the age of 21 years." Id. § 1(1). However, the Act continues
by stating that:
(2) An act which would otherwise be treated for the purposes of this Act
as being done in private shall not be so treated if done-
(a) when more than two persons take part or are present; or (b) in a
lavatory to which the public has or is permitted to have access, whether
on payment or otherwise.
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of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution
(Wolfenden Report).'
Commissioned by the English Parliament to study and
make recommendations on homosexuality and prostitution in
the United Kingdom,' the Wolfenden Report urged the gov-
ernment that it was improper for the law to concern itself with
what was done in private unless it could be shown to adversely
affect the public.30 Public moral conviction could not serve as
a valid basis for overriding individual privacy and personal
liberties3 since the only time governmental power may be
rightfully exercised over an individual is to prevent harm to
others.32
The Wolfenden Report did not explicitly define the term
"in private," but recommended the government use the same
criteria for both heterosexual and homosexual activity."3 Al-
though the Wolfenden Report suggested the decriminalization
of male homosexual acts in the limited private realm, it also
aspired to eliminate any public expression of homosexual activ-
ity. 4 For instance, the Wolfenden Report recommended strict
Id. § 1(2)(a)-(b).
The Act, which still does not apply to those in the armed forces or the
merchant navy, initially applied only in England and Wales, but was extended to
Scotland in 1980, and Northern Ireland in 1982; even under the amendment, how-
ever, homosexual activity is still illegal if acts occur in a place where others could
have access including hotel rooms and prisons. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 29.
Because the Act explicitly does not apply to public lavatories, police often hide
near toilets to "catch" homosexual men having sex. Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situ-
ation in the Member States, in HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUE:
ESSAYS ON LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 71, 89 (Kees
Waaldijk & Andrew Clapham eds., 1993) [hereinafter HOMOSEXUALITY ISSUES].
28. SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957, CMND 247 [hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT].
29. Id. 1.
30. Id. 9 14.
31. Id. 61.
32. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed.,
1956). Many scholars have debated the issue of whether the law can, and/or
should be utilized to protect public morality. Compare PATRICK DEVLIN, THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF MoRALS 24 (1965) (maintaining that since society can, and should
enforce public morality to preserve its own cohesion, the Wolfenden Report's main
error was attempting to distinguish between sin and crime) with HART, supra note
5, at 82-83 (arguing that society does not have the right to enforce its own morali-
ty and related the Wolfenden Report's publicdprivate dichotomy to Mill's theories
on opposition to governmental interference with an individual's activities that do
not adversely affect the public).
33. WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 28, q5 64, 355.
34. See generally GARY W. KINSMAN, THE REGULATION OF DESIRE: SEXUALITY
BROOK. J. INTL L.
police surveillance of public areas, increased employment dis-
crimination, and a higher age of consent for homosexual activi-
ty.Y
The Wolfenden Report, in effect, established a pub-
lielprivate dichotomy, in which homosexual persons are pro-
tected only within the limited private sphere. This dichotomy
subsequently influenced the European human rights legal
system in its decisions affecting lesbian and gay persons.36
B. The European Convention on Human Rights
Challenges to sodomy statutes in the member states have
been based upon the Convention. Reaffirming the member
states' belief in "[flundamental [reedoms... [as] the founda-
tion of justice and peace in the world," the Convention aims to
secure the universal and effective recognition of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and to achieve "the first steps for
the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the
Universal Declaration." 7
1. History of the Convention
The Council of Europe was established in 1949 as a peace-
ful association of democratic nations proclaiming their faith in
the collective rule of law and the "spiritual and moral value
of... [the member states'] heritage."" The Convention,"
IN CANADA 139-43 (1987) (critiquing the Wolfenden Reports public/private dichoto-
my as a social, rather than natural distinction).
35. WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 28, %% 72, 114-21, 218-21.
36. See infra Part H.
37. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 13, at 4. Since its ratification, over 16,000
complaints have been received under the Convention. Kevin Boyle, Europe: The
Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the European Community, in GUIDE TO INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 133, 135 (Hurst Hannun ed., 2d ed. 1992).
38. A. H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (3d ed. 1993) (quoting the
Preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe).
39. One source for the Convention was the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, a non-legally binding agreement adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1948. Id. at 6. Although similar in language to the rights guar-
anteed in the Convention, there has never been any challenge to sodomy laws
under the Declaration. While non-binding, the Declaration was intended as a mor-
al authority for the rest of the world. Id. All member states are bound to respect
the fundamental principles of the Convention; however, each signatory state deter-
mines its own rules to establish and maintain the guaranteed freedoms within its
own territory. Id. at 8.
432 [Vol.MXI2
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signed by the member states of the Council of Europe in
1950,40 was entered into force in 1953."'
Under Article 1 of the Convention, an immediate obliga-
tion is placed upon the member states to "secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction [s] " the rights defined in the Conven-
tion.42 However, both the Convention and general internation-
al law are silent as to the appropriate procedures which mem-
ber states must follow in conforming their own municipal laws
to accommodate the mandates of the treaty.43 Thus, since no
uniform procedure exists, the Convention has the force of law
in many countries, while in others, it does not. Where the
Convention is not part of the domestic law, the Convention
may appear much less significant, and a complainant wishing
to rely upon the Convention's provisions must be prepared to
take her case to the Council of Europe's judicial system in
Strasbourg.44
40. Id. at 11. Currently, the contracting states who have ratified the Conven-
tion are Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5
(entered into force Mar. 9, 1953) (Chart of Signatures and Ratifications); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 351 (1994); see also Andorra
Becomes 33rd Member of Council of Europe, Agence France Presse, Nov. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Latvia Joins Council of Europe,
UPI, Feb. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; European Con-
vention on Human Rights Protection Ratified, BBC, June 24, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File. Estonia has signed, but has not yet ratified
the Convention. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra. Additionally, Albania and
Moldova have recently joined the Council of Europe. Albania, Moldova Join Coun-
cil of Europe, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File. While Belarus, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and Ukraine have applied and are currently awaiting membership to
the Council, Russia's bid to join was suspended after its attack on the republic of
Chechnya. Chechnya Situation Blocks Russia From Council of Europe, Agence
France Presse, Feb. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
41. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 13.
42. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 13, at 4.
43. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 26.
44. Id. at 27. In countries where the Convention has been incorporated into
the domestic law, a complainant may use the national legal system since the mu-
nicipal court will directly apply the Convention's principles. Id. Recently, a bill
seeking to incorporate the Convention into United Kingdom law cleared the House
of Lords; however, because the government opposes the bill, it may be blocked in
the House of Commons. Andrew Evans, Rights Bill Clears Lords, Press Ass'n
BROOK. J. INTL L.
2. Guaranteed Rights Under the Convention
The Convention guarantees certain rights to all people
within the jurisdiction of its member states. For instance, the
Convention, like Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, provides a guaranteed right to privacy. Article
8 states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the inter-
ests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.45
Although Article 8 of the Convention explicitly guarantees
a right to privacy for all individuals, it does not attempt to
clearly define the notion of privacy. Instead, the judicial sys-
tem of the Council of Europe, including the Court and the
European Commission of Human Rights (Commission), is re-
quired to interpret the idea itself. For instance, the Commis-
sion has referred to private life as the right to live as one wish-
es, protected from publicity and "the right to establish and to
Newsfile, May 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. See
generally DAVID KINLEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPLI-
ANCE WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1993) (examining the incorporation debate in the
United Kingdom and advancing alternative proposals to secure that United King-
dom legislation complies with the mandates of the Convention). Nonetheless, sup-
port for requiring incorporation is found, by analogy in the European Court of
Justice's ruling that the community treaties, legislation, and decisions of the Euro-
pean Union may have direct effect within each member state regardless of a par-
ticular nation's legal system, based on a goal of effectiveness and the' renunciation
of sovereignty rights by the member states in favor of the European Union's legal
system. P. VAN DuK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPE-
AN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12-13 (2d ed. 1990). Under this dualistic sys-
tem, an individual complainant derives her rights directly from international law
and may invoke the Convention, which must then be applied by the municipal
courts. Id. at 13.
Further support for implicitly required incorporation is found in the pream-
ble of the Convention which states that the fundamental freedoms articulated
within are best protected "on the one hand by an effective political democracy and
on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights
upon which they depend . . . ." COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 13, at 4.
45. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 13, at 7.
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develop relationships with other human beings, especially in
the emotional field, for the development and fulfillment of
one's own personality."6
Article 10 of the Convention articulates the guaranteed
right of freedom of expression for all people within the member
states. It states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprise.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formal-
ities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the inter-
ests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclo-
sure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
The Convention also establishes a right to freedom of asso-
ciation. Article 11 states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and to freedom of association with others, including the right
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his in-
terests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are nec-
essary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall
46. X. v. Iceland, App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 86, 87
(1976). In a resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
the right to privacy was defined as "the right to live one's own life with a mini-
mum of interference. It concerns private, family and home life, physical and moral
integrity, honour and reputation, avoidance of being placed in a false light, non-
revelation of irrelevant and embarrassing facts . . . [and] protection from disclo-
sure of [confidential] information. .. ." EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS-COLLECTED TExTs 911.(1979).
47. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 13, at 8.
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not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exer-
cise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the
police or of the administration of the State. 8
Article 14 of the Convention is a non-discrimination clause
which can only be used to ensure non-discrimination with
respect to the other rights guaranteed in the Convention. It
states: "[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a na-
tional minority, property, birth or other status."9
3. Bringing a Complaint
The Convention also establishes the procedure by which
applicants may complain of a member state's breach of the
Convention. First, the complainant must apply to the Commis-
sion. Under Article 25, the Commission may receive petitions
from any person or organization claiming to be a victim of a
violation of the Convention by a member state, provided that
the member state has recognized the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission.0 Under Article 26, the Commission will only enter-
tain petitions after all domestic remedies have been exhaust-
ed."' According to Article 44, only the Commission or a mem-
ber state may bring a claim before the Court. 2 First, the
Commission must assess the admissibility of the application,
and once the application is admitted, it must determine the
facts and attempt to achieve a friendly settlement 3 However,
48. Id.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 12. All member states that have ratified the Convention have also
recognized the competence of the Commission to receive individual petitions. AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 40, at 351. In 1994, the United Kingdom was
the only member to refuse to agree to a Council proposal which would make an
individual's right of appeal a mandatory part of the Convention. Michael Binyon &
Alice Thomson, Britain Rejects Human Rights Move, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 19,
1994, at 2.
51. COLLECTEP TEXTS, supra note 13, at 12. The Convention states that the
exhaustion must be according to the generally recognized rules of international
law; the complaint must then be filed with the Commission within six months of
the member state's final decision. Id.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Boyle, supra note 37, at 136-37.
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if the Commission finds that a state has not breached the Con-
vention, an individual may not petition the Court.
Since its reports are not legally binding decisions, the
Commission holds the view that it is not constrained by its
prior reports and may reach different conclusions on similar
cases. Nonetheless, the case law of the Commission has been
relatively consistent.54 Once the Commission concludes that
there is a breach of the Convention, it may then refer the case
to the Court.55 Under Articles 52 and 53, the decision of the
Court is final, binding on the parties and no appeal lies
against it.56
Under Article 54, the execution of the judgment is over-
seen by the Committee of Ministers, 5 and is not completed
until the violating member state supplies information of the
measures it has taken to comply with the judgment." Al-
though the Committee does not have the legal means to force a
breaching state to execute a judgment, it may attempt to se-
cure compliance by placing extensive political pressure, along
with the threat of expulsion from the Council of Europe, on
such a state.59
II. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SODOMY
LAWS
Several complaints have been brought to the Commission
and the Court, challenging sodomy laws. All applicants have
challenged the legislation under Article 8 of the Convention,
claiming that the laws interfere with their right to respect for
54. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 44, at 117-18; J.G. MERRILLS, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
13-14 (2d ed. 1993).
55. Boyle, supra note 37, at 137. The Court consists of a number of judges
equal to the number of states in the Council of Europe. Id.
56. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 13, at 18. Article 52 states that "[tihe judg-
ment of the Court shall be final," while Article 53 states that '[tihe High Con-
tracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to
which they are parties." Id.
57. Id. The Committee of Ministers, whose members serve as government
representatives of the Council, is the political and executive branch of the Council
of Europe. Boyle, supra note 37, at 138.
58. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 13, at 18. Article 54 states that ItIhe judg-
ment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers which shall
supervise its execution." Id.
59. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 44, at 157.
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their private lives. Both the Commission and the Court have
eventually concluded that sodomy laws unjustifiably interfere
with the applicants' guaranteed right to privacy. However, the
approach they have used has failed to adequately protect the
fundamental freedoms and human rights of lesbian women and
gay men in the member states."
A. Early Unsuccessful Challenges
From 1955-78, the Commission repeatedly ruled inadmissi-
ble several applications challenging German sodomy laws,
unequal age of consent laws, and their harsh punishment.61
The Commission decided that sodomy laws did not interfere
with the private lives of the applicants since any interference
was lawful and necessary for the protection of public health or
morals under Article 8(2), which restricts the right of privacy
where the interference is lawful and necessary for a legitimate
goal.62
Once an interference has been established under Article
8(1), the government may still prevail by proving that the
interference was in accordance with the law, had a legitimate
goal, and was "necessary in a democratic society" to achieve
the stated goal.63 In X. v. United Kingdom,' for example, the
applicant was charged with two offenses of sodomy with two
eighteen-year-old men. After his final domestic appeal of his
two-and-a-half year sentence was dismissed, the applicant filed
a claim with the Commission.65 The Commission, although
recognizing that "a person's sexual life is an important aspect
of his private life" and that a conviction for sodomy violated
the applicant's right to respect for his private life under Article
8, unanimously concluded that the law was necessary to pro-
tect the rights of others and to protect others from harm.66
60. See supra text accompanying note 37 for the goals of the Convention.
61. Kane, supra note 15, at 451-52; ROBERTSON & MIERRILLS, supra note 38,
at 373; see, e.g., X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 5935/72, 3 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46 (1975); X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No.
530/59, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on HR. 184, 190 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
62. See X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 3 Eur. Comn'n HR. Dec. & Rep.
46; X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1960 Y33. Eur. Cony. on HR. 184.
63. See supra text accompanying note 45 for the text of Article 8.
64. App. No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comnn'n HR. Dec. & Rep. 66, 71, 73 (1978).
65. Id. at 68.
66. Id. at 75.
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The Commission used an extremely lax standard, finding that
since there was a "realistic basis for the... Government's
opinion that... young men [aged] eighteen to twenty-one who
are involved in homosexual relationships would be subject to
[detrimental] social pressures," the legislation was considered
to be necessary in a democratic society under Article 8(2).67
The applicant further complained that as a result of this
sodomy law, his freedom to express his love for other men
within a sexual relationship was severely restricted." The
Commission, however, concluded that the sodomy law did not
violate the applicant's right to freedom of expression, under
Article 10,69 since the "concept of 'expression'... concerns
mainly the expression of opinion and receiving and imparting
information and ideas." 0 According to the Commission, the
Article 10 definition of freedom of expression could not be ex-
tended to encompass the notion of physical expression of feel-
ings.
The right of privacy was also invoked in two applications
by transsexuals who complained of the refusal by their nation-
al authorities to recognize their new status as a result of their
sex conversion operations. In the first case, the Commission
ruled the complaint admissible71 and a "friendly settlement"
was reached soon afterwards.72 In the second, the Commission
ruled that the complaint was admissible,73 and then conclud-
ed that Belgium's refusal to "recognise an essential element of
[the applicant's] personality, namely, his sexual identity result-
ing from his changed" physical, social, and emotional role
amounted to a failure to respect his private life.74 The
67. Id. at 78.
68. Id. at 80.
69. See supra text accompanying note 47 for text of Article 10.
70. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 66, 80 (1978).
71. X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6699/74, 11 Eur. Comm'n
HR. Dec. & Rep. 16, 25 (1977).
72. X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6699/74, 17 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 21, 24 (1979). Specifically, the government decided that it would
correct entries in the birth register to recognize sex-conversions in cases of irre-
versible transsexualism. Id.
73. Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, App. No. 7654/76, 11 Eur. Conn'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 194 (1978).
74. Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 36 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. B) at 26 (1980) (citing
Report of the Commission, adopted on March 1, 1979). However, the applicant's
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Commission's explicit recognition that one's sexuality is an
important aspect of one's personal life of which undue inter-
ference would constitute a violation of Article 8, paved the road
for successful sodomy challenges.
B. Successful Challenges
In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom," the applicant, Jeffrey
Dudgeon, a thirty-five year-old homosexual man from Belfast,
challenged Northern Ireland's laws which criminalized "bug-
gery."" Although no prosecutions had been brought from
1972-1980, no official government policy existed. In fact,
Northern Ireland had proposed a draft order to bring its sod-
omy laws into line with those of England and Wales,77 but on
July 2, 1979, the government had decided not to pursue the
proposed legislation. " On January 21, 1976, the police went
to Dudgeon's home with a warrant for illegal drug possession,
eventually charging another man with the possession of illegal
drugs.79 Personal papers, including Dudgeon's diaries and cor-
respondence describing his homosexual activities, were
seized." Dudgeon was then taken to the police station and
complaint was ultimately unsuccessful because the Court ruled that he had not
yet exhausted his domestic remedies. Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 1980 Y.B. Eur.
Cony. on H.R. 490 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). See also Rees Case, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 19 (1986) (contrary to the Commission's unanimous decision, the Court ruled 12
to 3 that the government's refusal to alter the applicant's birth certificate to re-
flect her sex conversion operation did not violate Article 8); Cossey Case, 184 Eur.
Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 18 (1990) (same by a vote of 10 to 8); B. v. France, 232-C
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 53-55 (1992) (after distinguishing Rees and Cossey be-
cause birth certificates in France were intended to be continuously updated, the
Court held that France's refusal to indicate applicant's true sexual identity in such
documents violated Article 8). Recently, the Commission ruled admissible a claim
that the government's refusal to recognize the applicant as a legal father because
he was not born a biological male violated Article 8. Clare Dyer, Sex-Op Father
Wins Ruling, GUARDIAN (Manchester), Dec. 3, 1994, at 7.
75. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1981).
76. Under sections 61 and 62 of the 1861 Act, buggery, defined as "sexual
intercourse per anum by a man with a man or a woman, or per anum, or per
vaginam by a man or a woman with an animal," was punishable by a maximum
of life imprisonment; consent was not a defense. Id. at 8. No measures comparable
to the 1967 Act in the United Kingdom had ever been officially introduced in
Northern Ireland. Id. at 11.
77. See Sexual Offenses Act, supra note 27.
78. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-14.
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id.
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questioned for over four hours about his sexual life."' The po-
lice sent the investigative file to the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions, who, along with the Attorney-General, decided it would
not be in the best interest of the general public to prosecute.8 "
Although Dudgeon was never prosecuted, he still felt vic-
timized by this statute and applied to the Commission to chal-
lenge the law under the Convention.' The Commission ac-
cepted the application, affrming Dudgeon's status as a victim
because he had experienced fear, suffering, and psychological
distress due directly to the law's existence, concluding that the
"threat hanging over [the applicant] was real."4
The Commission decided that maintenance of the sodomy
law constituted an interference with Dudgeon's right to respect
for his private life, under Article 8.85 According to the Com-
mission, "either [the applicant] respect[s] the law and refrains
from engaging.., in prohibited sexual acts to which he is dis-
posed by reason of his homosexual tendencies, or he commits
such acts and thereby becomes liable to criminal prosecu-
tion."8 6 Unlike the earlier sodomy challenges, 7 the Commis-
sion ultimately decided this interference with the applicant's
privacy could not be justified. Although neither party contested
that the interference was '"in accordance with the law' since
the police acted according to the existing legislation, the Com-
mission ruled the law was not necessary in a democratic soci-
ety to achieve the government's goal of protecting the public's
health or morals. 8
The Court agreed with the Commission's findings and
ruled that Article 8 of the Convention had been breached. 89
The Court decided the word "necessary" did not have the flexi-
bility of expressions such as "useful, reasonable, or desirable,"
but instead implied a "pressing social need" must exist to justi-
fy the interference." Because the Court concluded that a bet-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 18.
87. See cases cited supra notes 61, 64.
88. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1981) (quot-
ing Article 8 of the Convention).
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 21. This analysis was first articulated in an earlier case where the
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ter understanding of homosexuality was developing, along with
an increased tolerance for homosexual behavior in the United
Kingdom, and in the majority of member states of the Council,
no pressing need existed for the statute and it therefore must
be invalidated.9 The Court additionally concluded the risk of
harm to the public was not sufficient justification, and none-
theless, that any such justification was outweighed by the
detrimental effects which the very existence of the legislation
could have on the lives of homosexual persons.92
Furthermore, the Court cautioned that public notions of
morality are not conclusive in assessing the necessity of main-
taining such interfering legislation, stating that "[alithough
members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral
may be shocked, offended, or disturbed by the commission by
others of private homosexual acts," this alone cannot warrant
the criminalization of consensual adult sexual behavior.
93
However, the Court was emphatic that decriminalization of
sodomy did not imply approval of homosexuality and that
"some degree of regulation of male homosexual conduct... [is]
necessary in a democratic society... [which] may even extend
to consensual acts committed in private." 4
Unfortunately, significant questions were left unresolved
since the Court refused to reach the question of whether this
particular sodomy law or unequal age of consent laws for ho-
mosexual activity violated Article 14, the non-discrimination
clause, in conjunction with Article 8." For instance, although
meaning of the phrase "necessary in a democratic society" was explored. Handyside
v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976) (agreed that the word
"necessary" was not synonymous with the words "indispensable," "useful," "reason-
able," or "desirable" and that instead, the government must show a "pressing so-
cial need"). Although the state does have a certain margin of appreciation in as-
sessing such a pressing need, such definitional power is not unlimited and the
Court is "empowered to ... [decide] whether a 'restriction' or 'penalty' is reconcil-
able . . . ." Id. at 23. See DR. RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 183-
85 (3d ed. 1993) (describing the protection of the state's permissible area of discre-
tion through the margin of appreciation).
91. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 20, 24.
95. Laurence R. Helfer, Note, Finding a Consensus on Equality: The Homosex-
ual Age of Consent and the European Convention of Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1044, 1055, 1076-78 (1990). Article 14 prevents the Convention's otherwise
permissible limitations of guaranteed rights from being imposed in a discriminato-
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the applicant had also alleged a breach of Article 14, based on
the differing treatment of homosexual men and that of homo-
sexual women, the Court concluded that due to its decision
that the legislation violated Article 8, it did not need to exam-
ine the claim under Article 14.96 Moreover, although both the
Commission and the Court decided that the legislation, as
applied to men over twenty-one-years old, violated Article 8,
they concluded that the higher age of consent for homosexual
activity was not a violation of Article 8."
In Norris v. Ireland," the applicant, David Norris, com-
plained about the existence of Irish laws criminalizing consen-
sual male homosexual activity in private. While Norris was not
charged with any criminal offense, the Court decided he was
still legally at risk of being prosecuted, and was thus directly
affected by the law since a "law which remains on the statute
book, even though it is not enforced in a particular class of
cases for a considerable time may be applied again in such
cases at any time."9' Unlike Dudgeon, Norris was not the sub-
ject of a police investigation. However, the Court ruled by eight
votes to six that the statute violated Norris' privacy rights,
concluding his case was virtually indistinguishable from Dud-
geon.
100
Most recently, in Modinos v. Cyprus,' the applicant
challenged a Cypriot statute which criminalized all male homo-
sexual activity.' 2 The applicant successfully argued that the
statute violated his right to privacy guaranteed under Article 8
of the Convention and Article 15 of the Constitution of the Re-
ry manner. For text of Article 14, see supra text accompanying note 49.
96. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1981). In a
1984 magazine article, Dudgeon claimed that the Court's paltry monetary award to
cover legal expenses was to punish him for his repeated efforts to force the Court
to analyze his complaint under Article 14. STEPHEN JEFFREY-POULTER, PEERS,
QUEERS, & COMMONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY LAW REFORM FROM 1950 TO THE
PRESENT 154 (1991).
97. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26.
98. 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
99. Id. at 16.
100. Id. at 17, 23.
101. 259 Eur. Ct. H.. (ser. A) at 7 (1993).
102. Section 171 of the criminal code of Cyprus states that "any person
who . . .has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or ...
permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him against the order of na-
ture is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for five years." Id.
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public of Cyprus. °3 Although there were no recent prosecu-
tions under the sodomy law, Modinos could still claim to be a
victim of the law because the Commission found the challenged
provisions had not yet been abolished and Modinos could be
affected by the Cypriot prohibition of homosexual acts."0 4 The
Court further held that the existence of this regulation of sexu-
al life "continuously and directly effects [Modinos'] private
life."105
Evidently, the Court and the Commission have been fairly
consistent in their decisions affecting sodomy laws. While pro-
viding limited protection for the sexual activity of two homo-
sexual men in the privacy of a bedroom, this approach has
failed to protect gay men in other important aspects of their
lives.
C. The Restricted Judicial Interpretation of the Right to
Privacy
In deciding that sodomy statutes violate Article 8 of the
Convention, the Court has accepted a limited definition of the
word "privacy." Instead of using Article 8 to invalidate all
statutes criminalizing consensual sexual activity, the Court
and the Commission have limited the potential scope of Article
8 to protect only those acts which occur within a restricted
definition of spatial privacy.0 6
103. Article 15 of the Cyprus Constitution was identical to Article 8 of the
Convention. Id.
104. Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 67 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
295, 299 (1991).
105. 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12. Because the government relied solely
upon its argument that there was no interference with the applicant's privacy, the
Court did not examine whether the prohibition was legitimate under Article 8(2).
Id.
106. Upholding the conviction of five gay men for taking part in consensual
sado-masochistic acts in their homes, one judge in the United Kingdom stated that
although "sexual activities conducted in private between no more than two con-
senting adults of the same sex ... are now lawful . . . [acts] performed in [oth-
er] circumstances ... remain unlawful . . . [since] Parliament has retained crimi-
nal sanctions against the practice, dissemination and encouragement of homosexual
activities." R v. Brown, [1993] 2 All EM. 75, 81 (Eng. HL.). However, in his dis-
sent, relying upon the decisions of the Court, Lord Mustill expressed the belief
"that the European authorities, balancing the personal considerations invoked by
art 8(1) against the public interest considerations ... clearly favour the right of
the appellants to conduct their private lives undisturbed by the criminal
law . . . ." Id. at 115.
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For instance, in Johnson v. United Kingdom,"°7 the Com-
mission decided the limited definition of privacy in the United
Kingdom's Sexual Offenses Act of 196708 did not violate the
applicant's right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention.
On October 3, 1982, the applicant had a party in his home
with forty other homosexual men, in which no one under the
age of twenty-one" 9 was invited or believed to have been
present."' The police arrived and arrested the applicant for
permitting prohibited homosexual acts to take place in his
home."1
Although no charges were actually brought, the applicant
challenged the law, claiming to be a victim of the legislation as
a result of his fear and anxiety due to this arrest and possible
future incidents.12 The Commission decided the provision in
the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967, which continued to
criminalize consensual homosexual acts if more than two per-
sons were present or participating, did not violate the
applicant's right to privacy."' Although the acts occurred in
the applicant's private dwelling, the Commission decided the
applicant could not prove that the legislation continuously and
directly affected his private life since he was not more predis-
posed to homosexual activity when more than two people were
present or participating." The Commission, therefore, con-
Recently, the Commission agreed to consider a complaint filed by three of
the men. Clare Dyer & John Carvel, Jailed Gays Win Right to Europe Case,
GUARDIAN (Manchester), Jan. 19, 1995, at 5. In accepting the case, the Commis-
sion acknowledged the applicants' argument that the fact that their acts "'may
have shocked or offended certain members of the public, when publicised through
prosecution . . . is not . . . sufficient reason for criminalising consensual private
adult sexual activities." Id. However, the Commission declared inadmissible sepa-
rate complaints brought by three men and two women who claimed that the risk
of prosecution for taking part in sado-masochistic behavior violated their rights
under the Convention. Id.
107. App. No. 10389/83, 47 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72 (1986).
108. The Sexual Offenses Act of 1967 criminalizes consensual male homosexual
acts if more than two persons are participating, or are present. For text of the
Act, see supra note 27.
109. Twenty-one was the homosexual age of consent in the United Kingdom. 47
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 73.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 73-74.
113. Id. at 76.
114. Id. at 74, 76.
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cluded that the law did not violate Article 8 of the Conven-
tion.115
The Commission's restricted notion of privacy under Arti-
cle 8 has apparently failed to protect both the sexual and other
expressive activities of lesbian and gay persons which occur
any place other than in the most confined definition of priva-
cy."' This restricted analysis makes little sense in achieving
the Convention's stated goal of striving for the fundamental
freedoms and human rights that the Convention aims to pro-
tect. l
III. THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE
DICHOTOMY
The decisions of the Court that laws criminalizing consen-
sual homosexual activity between two adult men in private
violate the Convention"' were declared by scholars to be "en-
lightened alternative[s] to adverse decisions by courts in the
United States and in individual European nations ....
Nevertheless, lesbian women and gay men in the Council have
been relatively unsuccessful in achieving acknowledgement of
their other important social concerns such as employment
discrimination, domestic partnership benefits, legalization of
same-sex marriages, hate crime statutes, and recognition of
lesbian and gay family life, due to the Commission's refusal to
extend the principles articulated in previous cases beyond the
constricted boundaries of private adult consensual sodomy.2
115. Id.
116. See infra Part I.
117. See supra text accompanying note 37.
118. See supra Part II.B.
119. Heifer, supra note 15, at 173.
120. Id. at 174; see also Heifer, supra note 95, at 1044, 1055. Indeed, these
types of restrictions have been cited by one author as more damaging than more
overt discrimination:
Liberal toleration instructs us that society ought not punish the commis-
sion of certain acts but ought to remain free to make indulgence in such
acts difficult when such acts are believed ... to offend or contradict
public ... sexual conduct norms . . . .This form of punishment, mostly
in the form of indirect conduct coercion, will ultimately be more debili-
tating than the older, cruder, and more direct traditional control of sexu-
al conduct.
Larry Catr Backer, Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization
of Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal
Toleration, 45 FLA. L. REV. 755, 797-98 (1993).
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These constraints have severely restricted same-sex rela-
tionships. Beyond their homes, homosexual persons in the
Council of Europe regularly experience second-class legal sta-
tus,'2' along with widespread public loathing and animosi-
ty.1" The current legal, political, and social status of h6mo-
sexual women and men in the Council is little better than that
of their counterparts in the United States since Dudgeon and
its successors have failed to provide a suitable framework on
which equal rights and fundamental freedoms for homosexual
persons can be built."
The interpretation of the right to privacy, used by the
Court and the Wolfenden Report, has established the founda-
tion for the unfair treatment of homosexual persons in the
member states. The public/private dichotomy they have relied
upon is based on an individual liberty theory. Since the fact
that some may dislike what others do in private is not consid-
ered harmful to society, the government cannot interfere with
that activity.24 However, these privacy requirements are
For an argument on why restrictions on homosexual behavior beyond the
narrow confines of spatial privacy are acceptable, see John M. Finnis, Law, Moral-
ity, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 11 (1995)
(arguing that the tolerance of private homosexual conduct does not imply general
acceptance of that conduct). But see Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual
Conduct: A Response to John Finnis, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 41
(1995) (reasoning that the state need not discourage public homosexual expression
since such behavior is not always morally wrong).
121. Claiming that gay people in the United Kingdom suffer severe discrimina-
tion in every area of their lives, one civil rights group leader accused British poli-
ticians of 'widespread homophobia." UK Gay Rights Record 'Worst in Europe,' IN-
DEPENDENT (London), June 29, 1994, at 3. Further, Andrew Lumsden, the editor of
a major gay newspaper in England, noted the persistent discrimination against
lesbian and gay persons: "[i]ts incomparably a better country in which to be gay
or come out as gay than in 1972 .... There's now an acceptance of the reality of
gay people .... [However] [tlhe great conservative institutions, the legislature,
the judiciary and the press are the exceptions to this improved climate." JEFFREY-
POULTER, supra note 96, at 164.
122. Lisa Bloom, We Are All Part of One Another: Sodomy Laws and Morality
on Both Sides of the Atlantic. 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 995, 998, 1015
(1986) (arguing that in order to fully protect lesbian and gay persons, the state
must replace the present rights-oriented legal paradigm with a feminist model
based on social cohesion and mutual concern).
123. See Kane, supra note 15, at 448 (notes that the right to privacy itself
"give[s] subtle credence to the notion that homosexuality is inherently immoral");
see also Helfer, supra note 15, at 173-74; Hefer, supra note 95, at 1045.
124. Bloom, supra note 122, at 997; see generally MILL, supra note 32. For
feminist critiques of the public/private distinction, see sources cited infra note 169.
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based upon (and also help to perpetuate) the myths and stereo-
types of homosexuality, by forcing all homosexual persons to
remain "in the closet" since the expression of their sexuality is
still considered immoral by the majority of the public. There-
fore, "only when same-sex lovers are behind closed doors, out
of sight of the still-disgusted majority, may they live free-ly.,,125
A. Family Life and Privacy
The public/private distinction which the Court and Com-
mission has relied upon to invalidate sodomy laws has not
been useful or effective in protecting the families and relation-
ships of homosexual women and men in the Council. The Com-
mission has repeatedly determined that the notion of family
life under Article 8 does not include lesbian and gay
families'26 since a "family" has been limited to include only a
man and a woman with all their possible offspring.
127
While continually excluding the families of homosexual
women and men, the Court and the Commission have recog-
nized other non-traditional families, including: brothers, sis-
ters, and other relatives; unmarried heterosexual couples shar-
ing a common household; polygamous families; and a parent
with a child born outside of marriage, or after divorce."2 For
instance, in the case of a Malaysian-English gay couple, their
relationship was not considered to fall within the scope of
family life under Article 8, allowing the British government to
125. Bloom, supra note 122, at 999 (arguing that the individual liberties ap-
proach traditionally used in sodomy challenges is unsatisfying for long-term prog-
ress since it still assumes that homosexuality is immoral, leaving the resolution of
the morality question up to the individual and instead advocates for a feminist
morality approach made up of mutual concern and social cohesion).
126. Andrew Clapham & JIH-. Weiler, Lesbians and Gay Men in the Europe-
an Community Legal Order, in HOMOSEXUALITY ISSUES, supra note 27, at 7, 43.
127. Evert van der Veen et al., Lesbian and Gay Rights in Europe: Homosexu-
ality and the Law, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND
GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 225, 230-32 (Aart Hendricks et al. eds., 1993).
128. Id. at 232; see, e.g., Kroon v. The Netherlands, App. No. 18535/91, 19 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 263 (1995) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (Article 8's notion of family life encompasses
other family situations including a father's relationship with his child born as a
result of an extramarital relationship); Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 21 (1994) (government's refusal to recognize an unmarried father as the
child's legal guardian violated Article 8's protection of family life); see also Pieter
Van Dijk, The Treatment of Homosexuals Under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, in HOMOSEXUALITY ISSUES, supra note 27, at 179, 189-92.
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deny the Malaysian partner a work permit in the United King-
dom. 29 An Australian-British lesbian couple and their child,
conceived through alternative insemination, were similarly
denied the family status necessary for their protection under
immigration law.'30 Additionally, in Italy and Switzerland,
the private and family lives of gay men are even further re-
stricted since both governments have been reported to compile
lists recording intimate details about the sexual lives of gay
men.
13 1
B. Threat of Criminal Sanctions
Private consensual homosexual activity is still illegal in
some of the newer parties to the Convention. For instance, in
Romania, "sexual relations between persons of the same sex"
are punishable by one to five years in prison."2 Furthermore,
in a report delivered to the 1994 Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe,'" the International Lesbian and Gay
129. X. & Y. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9369/81, 32 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 220, 221 (1983).
130. Evert van der Veen et al., supra note 127, at 231-32 (citing X. & Y. v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 14753/89 (1989) (unpublished)).
131. HEINZE, supra note 15, at 6.
132. Deborah Claymon, Gays in Romania Still Living in Fear, S.F. CHRON.,
July 11, 1994, at A9. Additionally, Amnesty International has noted that gay
Romanian men are targeted for ill-treatment and torture. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
BREAKING THE SILENCE: HUAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION 15 (1994); see also HEINZE, supra note 15, at 3. The International Human
Rights Law Group recently submitted an amicus brief to the Romanian C6nstitu-
tional Court, urging that it apply international human rights standards to decrimi-
nalize homosexuality. See Legal Memorandum of the International Human Rights
Law Group Submitted to the Romanian Constitutional Court, On the Application
of International Human Rights Standards to the Constitutionality of Article 200 of
the Romanian Criminal Code (on file with the author); see also Duc V. Trang, Be-
yond the Historical Justice Debate: The Incorporation of International Law and the
Impact on Constitutional Structures and Rights in Hungary, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 29 n.114 (1995). Although the court ruled that the sodomy provi-
sion was unconstitutional as applied to private consensual homosexual conduct, it
concluded that such restrictions were valid as applied to acts which created a
"public scandal" or were "perpetrated in public." Helfer & Miller, supra note 10,
manuscript at 42 & n.13. In response, the Romanian legislature proposed replacing
the phrase "public scandal" with "acts perpetrated in public" in an exception to a
draft of a law which would decriminalize private homosexual activity. Id. at 40-42.
However, the legislature will likely retain the other provision of the law which
would criminalize "propaganda, actions, association or any other proselytizing activ-
ities" related to prohibited homosexual activity. Id. at 40, 42.
133. The 53-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe aims to
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Association noted Belarus and Moldova still imprison people
for private consensual homosexual activity.
134
The public/private dichotomy similarly affects the daily
lives and existence of lesbian and gay persons in other nations
in the Council. For instance, in most European countries, "pub-
lic indecency" is still a criminal offense. Although usually
worded neutrally, like sodomy statutes, these laws are more
often used to penalize the sexual activities of homosexual men
rather than those of heterosexual persons." In England, two
men were convicted for cuddling and kissing in front of two
heterosexual couples on a London street late at night.1 36 The
court stated that "[o]vert homosexual conduct in a public
street,... may well be considered by many persons to be ob-
jectionable... [and] may well be regarded by another person,
particularly by a young woman,... [as insulting] by suggest-
ing that she is somebody who would find such conduct in pub-
lic acceptable herself."37 In 1988, a thirty-seven-year old man
was given a nine-month suspended sentence for gross indecen-
cy, and later arrested and jailed for "fondling and kissing" a
man in a churchyard late at night.3 In Italy, two men were
also imprisoned for the same offense.'39
According to section 32 of the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967,
it is unlawful for men to "persistently solicit or importune in a
public place for an immoral purpose," and since homosexual
behavior is still deemed by the law to be an immoral purpose,
it is a crime in the United Kingdom for a homosexual man to
have any contact with another man in a public place with a
view to engaging in otherwise lawful sexual activity.4 Thus,
protect human rights by developing democratic institutions through local officials,
activities, and non-governmental organizations. President Clinton, 1994 Summit of
the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Remarks at Plenary Session
(Dec. 5, 1994), in 5 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 1994 at 813, 815.
134. Policy Spectrum, WARSAW VOICE, Apr. 23, 1995, at 19. Lithuania has also
been reported to imprison adult males for committing homosexual acts. IIEINZE,
supra note 15, at 5.
135. Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 88-89.
136. Masterson v. Holden, [1986] 3 All E.R. 39 (Eng. Q.B.).
137. Id. at 44.
138. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 29-30.
139. Id. at 21.
140. Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 118-19. The term "persistently" has been
interpreted to mean more than once and "solicit or importune" covers a vast range
of words or gestures typically used by homosexual men while "cruising" to meet
other homosexual men. Id. Similarly, Finland criminalizes people who "publicly en-
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it is a criminal offense for homosexual men to meet other men
in bars, restaurants, parks, beaches, or any other public place
for the purpose of later engaging in otherwise lawful sexual
relations." In 1988, in the United Kingdom, 699 men were
convicted for soliciting or other offenses; from 1980-1988, there
were 10,476 prosecutions."
C. Restrictions on Freedom of Expression and Association
Reports about police raids on lesbian and gay bars and
discos are numerous. Although the official reason given for
these raids is usually the breach of licensing or drug laws, the
frequency of such raids suggest these laws are more severely
enforced against homosexual establishments.' Associations
between homosexual men are further restricted in Cyprus,
Italy, Greece, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, since openly
homosexual men cannot serve in the military.' Specifically,
gage[ ] in an act violating sexual morality," or who "publicly encourage[ ] indecent
behavior between members of the same sex." Heifer & Miller, supra note 10,
manuscript at 16 n.41.
141. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 29-30.
142. Id.
143. Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 117-18. In its 1994 report, the Department
of State noted that in Greece, police harass gay bar owners and gay men by de-
taining them at police stations and sometimes physically abusing them. DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1994 at 835 (Joint Comm. Print 1995). In England, one gay rights
activist noted:
These are not just incidents; they are part of a long and sordid history
of persecution and discrimination which most gay people thought was
coming to an end .... Police harassment tells us once more the lessons
we so tediously unlearned: gays ought to feel guilty, ashamed, ought to
keep quiet and invisible . . . and ought not to be able to organise and
meet together .... Our rights are being systematically taken from us,
most importantly our right to life with dignity and self-respect.
JEFFREY-POULTER, supra note 96, at 169.
144. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 14, 24, 29-30; Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71,
112. Although in 1991 the British Prime Minister announced that the military
would no longer prohibit homosexual persons from receiving security clearances,
the Ministry of Defense has continued to dismiss lesbian and gay service members
based on "incompatibility with the military services." DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra
note 143, at 1029. Recently, after the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence admit-
ted that since 1990, it dismissed 260 service members because of their sexual ori-
entation, two legal opinions suggested that such discrimination could violate the
Convention. Alan Travis, Axed Gays May Claim Millions, GUARDIAN (Manchester),
Aug. 5, 1994, at 1. In England, after being dismissed for revealing their sexual
orientation, four service members filed suit seeking to repeal the military ban. Gay
Military Officers Challenge Ban, Agence France Presse, May 15, 1995, available in
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in Portugal, the penal code outlaws, "acts against nature," and
the military code excludes those who have been involved in
such acts from the armed forces.'45 Furthermore, these Portu-
guese laws have been used effectively to deny gay parents
custody of their children following divorce. 4 In Turkey, after
the first gay pride conference was banned on July 2, 1993,
members of the foreign delegation were arrested and de-
tained.4 ' Amnesty International noted detention of the for-
eign delegation was "'solely by reason of their advocacy of ho-
mosexual equality and their real or presumed sexual orienta-
tion.""48 In Poland, forty examples of discrimination against
homosexual persons have been reported to occur in schools,
workplaces, the army, church, and by the police.'
In Austria, Finland, and Liechtenstein, it is illegal to ap-
prove of or promote homosexuality.5 ° The Austrian Supreme
Court relied upon its law to rule that all representations of
homosexuality were illegal since they were deemed to consti-
tute hard-core pornography.' A similar law in the United
Kingdom has been used by some local authorities as a reason
to refuse subsidies to lesbian and gay organizations.15 Fur-
thermore, lesbian and gay persons in the European Union
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Unfortunately, England's High Court upheld
the ban, concluding that it did not violate European or British domestic law. Ho-
mosexuals Fail in Historic Challenge Over Armed Forces Ban, Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, June 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
145. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 24.
146. Id.
147. James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation,
18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 86 (1994).
148. Id. (footnotes omitted). Amnesty International has further noted that gay
rights activists in Turkey are regularly subjected to harassment, intimidation, and
abuse. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 132, at 17. Moreover, arrests and
detentions of lesbian and gay persons based solely on their sexual orientation have
been reported in Romania, Russia, and Turkey. Id. at 31. In Romania, police were
reported to have physically abused detainees, who were charged with commiting
unlawful homosexual acts, to force them to confess. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 103D
CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993 at
1014 (Joint Comm. Print 1994).
149. Zbigniew Idziakowski, Anti-Homosexual Discrimination: The Shadows Out-
side the Closet, WARSAW VOICE, Apr. 23, 1995, at 19.
150. Policy Spectrum, supra note 134. Relying upon these laws, police have
occasionally confiscated AIDS-awareness brochures. Id.
151. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 12.
152. Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 116-17. Additionally, Austria and Liech-
tenstein officially forbid the establishment of gay rights organizations. Policy Spec-
trum, supra note 134.
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regularly encounter significant employment disadvantages.' 3
D. Unequal Ages of Consent
Although nearly all member states have repealed their
total prohibitions on homosexual acts, and private consensual
homosexual activity has not been officially prosecuted since
1974, many states still enforce unequal ages of consent for
homosexual and heterosexual activity.' For instance, in the
United Kingdom, the homosexual age of consent is eigh-
teen,'55 while the heterosexual and lesbian age of consent is
sixteen in Great Britain and seventeen in Northern Ire-
land.' Similarly, laws with unequal ages of consent still ex-
ist in Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, Germany, and
Greece.'57 Few states have equalized their ages of consent for
sexual activity even though in 1984, the European Parliament
urged member states to apply the same ages of consent for
homosexual acts and heterosexual acts, as well as to abolish
laws making homosexual acts between consenting adults liable
to punishment.
58
153. See David A. Landau, Note, Employment Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gays: The Incomplete Legal Responses of the United States and the European
Union, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 335, 341 (1994) (citing ANYA PAiMER, LESS
EQUAL THAN OTHERS: A SURVEY OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN AT WORK 1-20
(1993)). Landau describes that in Palmer's recent survey in Great Britain, half of
the gay and lesbian people interviewed reported that they had experienced harass-
ment in the workplace ranging from vicious gossip to death threats; two-thirds of
those surveyed currently hide their sexual orientation from their colleagues. Id.
Additionally, a survey in Italy found that one-fourth had been dismissed because
of their homosexuality. Id. Furthermore, in Ireland, 58 percent of lesbian and gay
persons believed they would face discrimination if they were open about their
sexual orientation. Mary Cummins, Guide to be Published on Employee's Rights,
IRISH TIMES, Apr. 1, 1993, at 4.
154. Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 83-84.
155. In February 1994, while Parliament voted to lower the homosexual age of
consent from twenty-one to eighteen, it rejected a proposal to equalize the age of
consent for homosexual and heterosexual activity. Alan Travis, Peers Support Con-
sent Age of 18, GUARDIAN (Manchester), June 21, 1994, at 6. In June, 1994, the
House of Lords voted 176 to 113 to reject an attempt to restore the homosexual
age of consent to twenty-one. Id.
156. Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 86. Recently, however, the Commission re-
quired the United Kingdom government to justify its reasons for setting a higher
homosexual age of consent. Severin Carrell, Policy on Teenage Gays May be Illegal,
SCOTSMAN, Jan. 28, 1995, at 4.
157. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 12-21; Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 85-86.
158. Waaldijk, supra note 27, at 71, 82-83.
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In 1988, in England and Wales, twenty-three men over the
age of twenty-one were convicted, under the Sexual Offenses
Act of 1967, of having sexual relations with men aged sixteen
to twenty-one.5 9 In fact, overall, the number of men prose-
cuted for expressing their homosexual attraction is greater
today than before the 1967 Amendment, which decriminalized
private, consensual homosexual behavior. 6 In the four years
after the 1967 reform was passed, the conviction rate for homo-
sexual offenses rose 160 percent.' Moreover, one police offi-
cer was reported, by an observer, to have stated: "now that
you are legal, this should be done in your homes.""62
In November, 1989, the European Parliament reiterated
its support for equal rights for homosexual persons after the
European Commission recommended legislation which would
include job protection for homosexual persons.'63 In February,
1994, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolu-
tion, stating that member states should abolish all legal provi-
sions that criminalize and discriminate against sexual acts
between persons of the same sex.' However, because the
159. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 29. In the United Kingdom, until 1994, twen-
ty-one was the homosexual age of consent as compared to sixteen for heterosexual
and lesbian age of consent. See supra note 155.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. KINSMAN, supra note 34, at 143.
163. TATCHELL, supra note 14, at 7.
164. John Carvel, MEPs Back Gay and Lesbian Right to Marry, GUARDIAN
(Manchester), Feb. 9, 1994, at 10. Originally, the European Parliament had asked
the European Commission on instruction of the European Union, to draft a bind-
ing directive on combatting sexual orientation discrimination. However, the final
version of the resolution instead asked the European Commission to establish a
recommendation based on the notion of equal treatment for all persons regardless
of their sexual orientation. Id. Furthermore, the resolution specifically called "on
the [European] Commission and the Council [of Ministers] to accede to the" Con-
vention as "a first step towards more vigorous protection for human rights." Reso-
lution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in the EC, 1994 O.J. (C 61)
40, 41. The resolution further recommended that member states of the European
Union apply equal ages of consent for homosexual and heterosexual acts; work to
decrease the number of acts of anti-gay hate violence; combat all forms of social
discrimination; and ensure that lesbian and gay social organizations have equal
access to national funds as other social and cultural organizations. Id. at 42. Addi-
tionally, Parliament asked that the European Commission draft a recommendation
seeking to end discriminatory ages of consent; criminalization of homosexuality, all
forms of discrimination; and any restrictions on the ability of lesbian and gay
persons to marry or become parents. Id. In May 1995, the European Parliament
once again expressed its support for a ban on sexual orientation discrimination,
454
PROPOSALS FOR PROGRESS
European Parliament has little more than a consultative role
and is relatively powerless, the European Union took no fur-
ther action on the Parliament's urgings, and the European
Commission's recommendations were never acted upon.165
Apparently, lesbian women and gay men still face frequent
and persistent discrimination and adverse treatment. Within
the member states, although homosexual persons are protected
within the limited private realm, their other fundamental
freedoms and rights remain unprotected.
IV. ANALYSIS
The fact that the criminal law in many member states of
the Council still discriminates against homosexuality can serve
as justification for other forms of discrimination by both public
authorities and private organizations and individuals. Al-
though the Court has invalidated sodomy laws, its approach
has failed to provide adequate protection for the lives of homo-
sexual persons. Instead of interpreting the Convention in a
manner consistent with its stated goals, the Court has only
established an arbitrary distinction based on spatial privacy
which has been futile for recognizing many other fundamental
rights of homosexual persons in the member states.
A. New Methods for Invalidating- Sodomy Laws
Although sodomy laws are not always criminally enforced,
their invalidation is necessary to effectively lay the ground-
work for the achievement of human rights for lesbian women
and gay men.66 However, different approaches or methodolo-
adopting a resolution which states "[the treaty [of the European Union] should
contain a clear rejection of racism, xenophobia, sexism, discrimination on grounds
of a person's sexual orientation, anti-semitism, revisionism and all forms of dis-
crimination, and guarantee adequate legal protection against discrimination for all
individuals ... in the European Union." Sexual Orientation a Non-Discrimination
Area in EU?, July, 1995, available in >gopher:I/seta.fi.
165. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 14, at 251-53. The European Parliament was
designed to serve more as a deliberative body than as a true parliament, and
therefore, its functions are as a supervisory and advisory body. Id. After receiving
reports from its committees, the European Parliament will submit final versions to
the Council of Ministers, which is not bound by any of Parliament's opinions. Id.
at 255.
166. Although this Note primarily focuses on the invalidation of sodomy stat-
utes, the proposed analysis can also effectively be used to challenge other discrimi-
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gies to the invalidation of sodomy statutes can create even
more problems. A new legal analysis must be constructed in
order to both invalidate sodomy statutes (and any other simi-
lar restrictions on consensual adult sexual behavior) and better
protect homosexual relationships. A continuous reliance upon
the severe limitations of "the right to respect for private life"
under Article 8, as interpreted by the Court and the Commis-
sion, will not ensure the fundamental freedoms and human
rights for homosexual women and men in the member states.
Many authors have criticized the notion of the right to
privacy because the right of privacy, due to its homophobic
nature, only limits the degree of interference with homosexual
persons' privacy, rather than providing a legal guideline for the
total elimination of that interference.167 Others criticize the
inherent heterosexist notions of sexual privacy."' Some femi-
nists have argued that viewing the family as part of the pri-
vate, rather than the public, domain of society can discourage
the government from taking affirmative steps to change the
structures within the actual family, which traditionally have
disadvantaged women."6 9
natory restrictions on the lives of lesbian and gay persons. Thus, even after the
invalidation of all sodomy laws, the advocated proposals can be used to eradicate
"gross indecency," "public scandal," or other similar discriminatory provisions. See
supra Part EI13 for examples of such discriminatory laws. Additionally, these
proposals can be used to invalidate unequal age of consent laws, as well as other
government-imposed or-sanctioned discrimination against homosexual persons. See
supra Parts HILA, C-D for examples.
167. Kane, supra note 15, at 473-74; see David Cole & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual
(Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994); see also Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimina-
tion, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 199 (1994) (describing how the rights arguments often
require their proponents to carry the heavy burden of proving that justification
does not exist for anti-gay discrimination).
168. RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
63 (1992). Professor Robson also criticizes the privacy right as being dependent
upon the "legally sacred concept" of physical property, and thus "[s]exual priva-
cy . .. must exist as an appendage to private property." Id. at 69.
169. DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 354 (1993). See generally Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (examining the feminist critique of the right
to privacy). Moreover, one author has noted that "[tihe concept of sexual privacy
[is] rooted in the rule of men over women and over property." ROBSON, supra note
168, at 70; see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1177 (1986) (describ-
ing the way men's power over women can often be seen as part of the private
realm).
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While the many critiques of the right of privacy are vastly
different, and often irreconcilable, it is clear that the interpre-
tation of the privacy right relied upon by the Court and the
Commission is not protecting homosexual relationships, out-
side of the limited confines of the bedroom, or other protected
coupling places. Because the restricted interpretation of the
word privacy relied upon by the Court has not fully provided
protection for the lives of homosexual men in the member
states, many other aspects of their lives are adversely affected.
B. Proposed Alternatives to Invalidate Sodomy Statutes Using
the Convention
When a member state signs on to the Convention, the
Convention's only capacity to insure compliance is through the
Council of Europe's judicial system. Since the Court and Com-
mission are the principal enforcement mechanisms of the Con-
vention, and are looked to as tribunals of last resort for inter-
preting human rights in the Council, they are entrusted to
fully and adequately ensure those freedoms and rights. Since
the earlier sodomy decisions have not ensured the Convention's
guaranteed freedoms and rights for lesbian and gay persons in
the member states, the Court and the Commission must con-
struct an analysis which will safeguard the mandates of the
Convention." °
Intercourse has never been comprehended by law as a private act of
personal freedom except in one limited sense: those who belong to men
as chattel property or who are used by them as sexual objects . . . can
be encompassed in a man's privacy such that they disappear altogether
inside it.
DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 148.
[run the so-called private sphere of domestic and family life . .. there is
always the selective application of law . . . [which] invokes "privacy" as a
rationale for immunity in order to protect male domination ....
The rhetoric of privacy that has insulated the female world from
the legal order sends an important ideological message to the rest of
society. It devalues women and their functions and says that women are
not important enough to merit legal regulation.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 977-78
(1991); see also Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Pub-
likPrivate Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 319 (1993).
170. Case law establishes that the Convention is to be viewed as "a living
instrunent" which must be "interpreted in light of present-day conditions." See,
e.g., Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1993); Inze v. Aus-
tria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1987).
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1. Recognition of Autonomy-Based Privacy
The Court has based its interpretation of the privacy right
under Article 8 on limited physical and spatial boundaries.
This definition of privacy only protects homosexuality which
occurs in private, thereby maintaining the concept of homosex-
uality as immoral and improper for public view. Moreover, by
placing unreasonable emphasis on the occurrence of sexual
activity, the Court has failed to protect the other legitimate
needs and concerns of lesbian and gay persons in the member
states.
Since the privacy right can encompass both autonomous
choices as well as protection of the domestic sphere, the focus
tends to be limited to whether there has been governmental
interference with the familial sphere, rather than whether the
government has interfered with the individual's right to auton-
omy.' Nevertheless, the privacy right must be re-articulated
to protect from governmental interference activities occurring
outside the familial environment.
The right to privacy has yet to acquire a sufficient defini-
tion in both the Council and the United States. " The early
right to privacy laws in the United States and in the member
states of the Council were based on the proverb, "an
Englishman's dwelling house is his castle,"173 but that defini-
tion of privacy was expanded in the United States by early
cases like Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade,
75
171. Riane Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theory for Action, 9
HUM. RTS. Q. 287 (1987). The author further notes that "the principle of noninter-
ference with 'family autonomy' . .. [has] been applid ... to maintain a particu-
lar type of familial (and social) organization: a male headed, procreation-oriented
patriarchal family in which women have few if any individual rights." Id. at 293.
Similarly, as a result of this traditional articulation of the privacy right, lesbian
and gay rights are also inadequately protected.
172. Privacy, as a "concept and a right, stands in great need of the few cer-
tainties and limitations that definition affords us." Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 296 (1977); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (arguing that the right to privacy is
the freedom not to have one's life "too-totally determined by a progressively more
normalizing state," and that the right to privacy must exist because democracy
must impose certain limits on the extent of the state's control on individual lives,
although recognizing that there is no such sphere of an individual's private life
with which the state has nothing to do).
173. This adage has formed the basis for the definition of privacy relied upon
by the Court, the Commission, and many other judicial systems, which only in-
cludes those incidents which occur at home with the doors locked.
174. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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which involved individual decision-making processes, not con-
fined to physical boundaries such as homes and bedrooms. 6
Unfortunately, in the United States, other decisions since
Griswold and Roe have still refused to recognize privacy rights
where certain "self-regarding" choices of individuality have
been involved.' Although the U.S. Supreme Court had re-
garded activities such as choosing a spouse, using contracep-
tives, and bearing children as protected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court refused to extend the right to privacy
to safeguard private homosexual activity."8
An early United States decision called "the possession and
control of [one's] own person" a sacred right protected from
undue "interference of others."'79 One New York court has
stated that the right of privacy is "a right of independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions, with a concomi-
tant right to conduct oneself in accordance with those deci-
sions, undeterred by governmental restraint." 0 Another defi-
nition was advocated by the Nordic Conference of Jurists in
1967, stating privacy means "'the right to be let alone, to live
one's own life with the minimum degree of interference."""'
The Council of Europe's legal system has recognized cer-
tain autonomous choices can fall under the protection of the
right to respect for private life, under Article 8(1). For in-
175. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
176. See Stephanie Ridder & Lisa Woll, Transforming the Grounds: Autonomy
and Reproductive Freedom, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (1989) (arguing for recog-
nition of a right to autonomy for women and men since women's attempt at fitting
into other legal constructions, such as the right to privacy, is not succeeding be-
cause these constructions were not developed to deal with issues affecting women).
177. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335,
1396-1420 (discussing "fundamental-decision privacy" as a byproduct of technologi-
cal advances which have created a sphere of personal choice never previously
imagined).
178. See Daniel J. Langin, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Right of Privacy and
the Question of Intimate Relations, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1443 (1987) (arguing that the
narrow approach used in Bowers is erroneous because it disregarded the protection
of individual self-identity and significantly narrowed the scope of privacy rights);
see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Curiously, in Bowers, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court chose to ignore the Court's decision in Dudgeon, al-
though it was mentioned in an amicus brief to the court. Id.
179. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
180. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1980).
181. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Meaning of the "Right to Respect for Private
Life" Under the European Convention of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283, 285
(1983) (quoting the Nordic Conference of Jurists).
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stance, the Commission has recognized both obligatory haircut-
ting'82  and required uniforms 83  did interfere with the
applicants' right to respect for their private lives. Thus, these
decisions establish that the protection of the right to privacy
under Article 8 must also encompass the individual's decision
to engage in self-identifying activities. Protection of this right
must be ensured regardless of whether the activities occurred
in the presence of other consenting adults or whether they
occurred in the Court's limited definition of privacy.
Autonomy, in the sense of fundamental human rights, is
an assumption that all persons possess a range of capacities
enabling them to develop plans of actions for their own lives
and the way they are lived." 4 Instead of protecting only the
sexual act itself, employing the right to autonomy to invalidate
sodomy laws will safeguard and protect lesbian and gay rela-
tionships, ensuring that the Convention is adequately main-
taining and securing the fundamental rights of all people.
Although the right to personal autonomy is implicit in
both the Convention and the decisions of both the Commission
and the Court, the Council of Europe's judicial system still has
been unwilling to extend the notion of privacy when it involves
homosexual relationships. However, it is necessary that the
Court and the Commission recognize the personal autonomy
rights inherent in the Convention's protections.,
Without recognizing the right under Article 8 to personal
autonomy, along with the right to spatial privacy, in invalidat-
ing sodomy statutes, the Convention makes little sense in
achieving human rights and fundamental freedoms for lesbian
and gay persons within the member states. 85
182. Sutter v. Switzerland, App. No. 8209/78, 16 Eur. Conm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 166 (1979). Here, the applicant complained of his obligation to cut his hair
for military courses. Although the Commission recognized that this may interfere
with his private life, it was necessary under the second paragraph of Article 8. Id.
183. McFeeley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8317/78, 20 Eur. Coim'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 44, 90-91 (1980). The Commission recognized that the "requirement
that the applicant[s] wear prison uniform[s] constituted an interference with their
right to respect for their private lives," but justified the interference under Article
8(2). Id.
184. Richards, supra note 5, at 964-65; see also Schneider, supra note 169, at
994-98 (describing the "more affirmative dimension of the right to privacy" which
encompasses the concepts of liberty, autonomy, and freedom of choice).
185. See supra text accompanying note 37 for the goals of the Convention.
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2. Freedom of Expression under Article 10186
Invalidation of sodomy statutes can also be accomplished
through the freedom of expression clause, thereby helping to
insure more of the freedoms and rights articulated in the Con-
vention for lesbian and gay persons in the member states.
Freedom of expression under Article 10 has been interpreted
broadly by the Court, and has not been restricted to the writ-
ten or spoken word. 7
While in X. v. United Kingdom,"s the Commission ruled
sodomy statutes, as applied to men under twenty-one years
old, do not violate either Article 8, or Article 10, since the no-
tion of "expression" under Article 10 was not deemed to encom-
pass the sexual expression of emotions, none of the later suc-
cessful challenges under Article 8, have mentioned Article
10.189 Because X. v. United Kingdom has effectively been
overruled by the Court's later successful sodomy challeng-
es,190 a complaint based on Article 10 is still viable.
Certain physical activities as a means of expression have
been recognized as worthy of protection under the right to
freedom of expression. The U.S. Supreme Court has extended
the right to freedom of expression under the First Amendment
to include wearing of certain articles to protest government
action,' alleged abuse of the flag,'92 live nude dancing'93
and possessing "obscene" material in the privacy of one's
186. See supra text accompanying note 47 for text of Article 10.
187. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 148.
188. App. No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 66, 75, 80 (1978).
For a description of the Commission's conclusion, see supra text accompanying
notes 64-70.
189. See supra Part II.B.
190. See supra Part II.B.
191. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (criminalizing the public display of
an expletive on a jacket violated the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armband is a sym-
bolic act protected within the free speech clause of the First Amendment).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning as
a means of expression is fully protected by the First Amendment); Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (state's interest in preventing breaches of peace did not
justify defendant's conviction for flag burning); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974) (defendant's freedom of expression was violated when he was convicted for
hanging a flag, upside down, with a peace symbol affixed).
193. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Schad v. Bor-
ough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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Similarly, in the member states, the prosecution of an
artist for displaying paintings which were allegedly obscene
raised an issue under Article 10.' The Court concluded that
artistic expression fell within the ambit of Article 10, although
it is not specifically stated, since the Convention does not dis-
tinguish between the various forms of expression. Moreover,
the Court emphasized that the right to freedom of expression
is made applicable "not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the
State... [because] [such are the demands of that pluralism,
tolerance, and broadmindedness without which there is no
'democratic society.""9  More recently, in Scherer v. Switzer-
land, the Commission relied upon Article 10, rather than Arti-
cle 8, to conclude by twelve votes to five that the applicant's
conviction for showing an "obscene" gay film in the back room
of his store violated the Convention.'97
Since expression of same-sex affection and intimacy em-
bodies deep communicative significance, public display of that
intimacy has been cited as an important critique of gender
assumptions and gender roles.9 ' By restricting the ability of
homosexual men to engage in consensual physical relation-
ships, the state is interfering with their right to freedom of
expression.
Because the references under Article 10(2) to national
security, public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime
194. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
195. Muller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.. (ser. A) at 23 (1988). However,
the Court concluded that under Article 10(2), the conviction and fines were justifi-
able, even though it recognized that public conceptions of sexual morality had
changed in recent years. Id. at 22-23.
196. Id. at 22.
197. 287 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7, 20 (1994). After the applicant died, how-
ever, the Court dismissed the case, concluding that the applicant had effectively
lost his standing to challenge both the conviction and the law. Id. at 15.
198. Cole & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 167, at 328; Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,
Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALTY 9 (1991) (maintaining
that same-sex marriage would reconstruct the current parameters of the institution
since the gender imbalances, evident in traditional concepts of marriage, would be
unavoidably different in same-sex marital unions); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 187, 197 (the "historical jus-
tifications for condemnation of homosexuality are based on patriarchal cultural
arrangements and value structures that are no longer defensible").
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correspond to the limitations found in other provisions,'99 the
same "pressing social need" as required in Dudgeon would be
required to justify the state's interference with an applicant's
freedom of expression."' It would be difficult for the govern-
ment to meet the burden of showing that severe restrictions on
consensual physical expression between homosexual men and
women are necessary in a democratic society for the mainte-
nance of public safety or morals.2 ' In Muller v. Switzer-
land,.2 the Court recognized the intent of the freedom of ex-
pression clause is to foster open-mindedness and diversity. A
member state should not be permitted to justify its interfer-
ence with freedom of expression by claiming it is protecting the
public from objectionable conduct. Based on Article 10 alone,
sodomy statutes can both be invalidated, as well as provide a
rational framework which could be later employed to protect
the relationships of lesbian and gay persons in the member
states.
Furthermore, although the Convention permits certain
limitations on the guaranteed rights, Article 14 prevents those
limitations from being imposed in a discriminatory manner.
While some claims succeed because the state cannot show the
distinction has a legitimate aim, 3 others succeed because
the restriction is not proportional to the state's otherwise legit-
imate aim.2"4 Although the issue of discrimination can some-
times be resolved solely by applying the same criteria as had
199. For the text of other articles of the Convention with similar provisions,
see supra text accompanying notes 45, 47-48.
200. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 21 (1981).
201. The only restrictions that would easily survive under this justification
argument would be those that are similarly based on heterosexual relationships.
202. 133 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 22 (1988); see also text accompanying notes
195-96.
203. See Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 15 (1990) (Article 14,
in conjunction with Article 1, was breached since the government could not articu-
late a legitimate interest for the distinctions it created when taxing residents and
non-residents).
204. See Case of James and Others, 98 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 44-45 (1985)
(concluding that different treatment of property leaseholds did not violate Article
14, since the government could articulate a reasonable and objective justification
for the distinction which was therefore, not discriminatory). Additionally, Judge
Brian Walsh of the Court has noted that although "a particular measure may be
objectively justified, [it] may not be acceptable because the means adopted are
disproportionate to the ends sought to be achieved." Brian Walsh, The European
Court of Human Rights, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 271, 282 (1987).
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already been applied in analyzing the claim under the substan-
tive law,"5 Article 14 sometimes introduces an entirely new
element to be considered. 6
For instance, in Case of Abdulaziz,2"7 Article 14 was ap-
plicable, even though the Court had decided Article 8 had not
been violated. Under the challenged immigration rules, a man
could obtain permission for his non-national spouse to enter
the country much easier than could a woman."' While the
Court accepted that the government's goal of protecting the
domestic labor market was legitimate, the Court still decided
that the measures violated Article 14, in conjunction with
Article 8.209 The Court articulated a heightened standard for
sex discrimination claims, stating that "very weighty reasons
would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on
the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the
Convention."
210
Article 14 was also invoked in a complaint by two maga-
zine editors, who were prosecuted for publishing a poem and
an illustration depicting fellatio with the body of Christ.
21
"
The Commission ruled the complaint inadmissible, stating
there was no proof that the applicants had been singled out
based on their homosexual tendencies. Moreover, there was no
205. See Hoffmann v. Austria, 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (after the court
ruled that Article 8, in conjunction with Article 14, had been violated, there was
no need to examine the government's discriminatory denial of the applicant's peti-
tion for child custody under Article 8 alone).
206. See X. v. The Netherlands, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 274, 296 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.) (holding that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was not applicable, but
nevertheless applied Article 14 and examined whether the challenged legislation
was discriminatory in its application). Previously, the Commission had stated in its
Report of June 24, 1965, that an inquiry under Article 14 was not limited to cases
in which an accompanying violation of another article of the Convention was pres-
ent. Belgium Linguistics Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 305 (1967).
207. 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1985).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 37, 39.
210. Id. at 38. The Court used analogous reasoning to conclude that a Swiss
law prohibiting a husband from using his pre-marital surname before his wife's
surname as his marital family name violated Article 14 in conjunction with Article
8. See Burghartz v. Switzerland, 280 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). Similarly, Swit-
zerland violated Article 14 when, without a hearing, it terminated a woman's
disability benefits shortly after she gave birth on the assumption that she would
not return to work. Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 263 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
5 (1993).
211. Gay News Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8710/79, 5 Eur. 11R. Rep.
123, 126 (1982) (Commission report).
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evidence suggesting that the poem would not have been re-
stricted in exactly the same way had it been published by
persons without homosexual tendencies.212 In this ruling, the
Commission has implicitly recognized discrimination based on
sexual orientation could violate Article 14. Although unsuccess-
ful,213 this case provides the framework for later complain-
ants to argue they are being discriminated against based on
their homosexual orientation, rather than based on their gen-
der.
For instance, in analyzing sodomy laws,214 because the
state places no similar restrictions upon the freedom of physi-
cal expression of heterosexual men, Article 14,215 along with
Article 10, is breached when the state penalizes only homosex-
ual activity. The state is thereby treating a homosexual man
differently by restricting his physical expression towards other
men, simply based on his sexual orientation, or, alternatively,
his gender.21 Such discriminatory restrictions on the rights
of homosexual men under Article 10 clearly violate Article 14
since the rights of heterosexual men are not similarly restrict-
ed.217
212. Id. at 131.
213. Recently, a film maker successfully challenged United Kingdom's blasphe-
my law, claiming that the banning of his film violated his right to freedom of
expression. Simon Perry, Europe Rejects Ban on Erotic Christ Film, EVENING
STANDARD (London), Mar. 24, 1995, at 15. Agreeing with the complainant, the
Commission has referred the case to the Court, which is expected to decide the
case later this year. Id.
214. Article 14 can also be used in conjunction with Article 8 to invalidate
unequal age of consent laws. See generally Helfer, supra note 95.
215. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
216. Sinqe Article 14 does not explicitly prohibit sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, relying upon Gay News, an applicant may attempt to convince the Commis-
sion and the Court that discrimination based on sexual orientation is similarly
proscribed under Article 14. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13 for a de-
scription of the Commission's holding in Gay News. Once sexual orientation is
recognized under Article 14, the applicant's rights have been violated if he has
been treated differently based on his sexual orientation, and that distinction is
either illegitimate, or disproportionate to an otherwise legitimate aim. See supra
notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
Additionally, because Article 14 explicitly prohibits gender discrimination, a
complainant's rights have been violated if he has been treated differently solely
because of his gender. See generally Koppelman, supra note 167 (maintaining that
discrimination based on sexual orientation can and should be recognized as sex
discrimination prohibited under the United States Constitution).
217. Although one may also argue that there is a discriminatory difference
between the treatment of homosexual women and homosexual men, this argument
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Once the Court recognizes the right to freedom of expres-
sion as encompassing the right to engage in homosexual activi-
ty, other laws resulting in differential treatment can be simi-
larly invalidated. By using Article 10, more protection is guar-
anteed to homosexual relationships outside of the limited con-
fines of bedrooms.
3. Freedom of Association under Article 11218
Article 11 is triggered when people are prevented from
joining or forming their chosen associations.219 For instance,
in Young v. United Kingdom, 0 the Court ruled compulsory
union membership violated the applicants' right to freedom of
association under Article 11. The Court decided that Article 11
incorporated a "negative right" not to be compelled to join
unions. Similarly, the Court stated: "[an individual does not
enjoy the right to freedom of association if in reality the free-
dom of... choice which remains available to him is either
non-existent or so reduced as to be of no practical value."21
The government's interference with the applicants' freedom of
association was not justified since it was not considered "neces-
sary in a democratic society."' The Court reiterated that
"necessary" is not as flexible as "useful" or "desirable," and
that all member states' restrictions on an individual's Conven-
tion rights must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued.'
This logic was restated recently in Sigurj6nsson v. Ice-
may backfire since the member state can simply criminalize lesbian sexuality as
well. A member state wishing to comply with a ruling which concluded that its
laws discriminated because only the behavior of homosexual men was criminalized
could simply enact legislation criminalizing lesbian sexuality as well. Moreover, the
Court and the Commission had stated in previous rulings, including Dudgeon, that
the state has more interest in protecting the public from homosexual men, since
they were considered to be more dangerous to public morality and health. See
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); see also X. v. Unit-
ed Kingdom, App. No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 66 (1978); X. v.
Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
46 (1975).
218. See supra text accompanying note 48 for text of Article 11.
219. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 160.
220. 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8, 23-26 (1981).
221. Id. at 23.
222. Id. at 25.
223. Id.
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land. 4 The Court ruled a law making membership in a taxi-
drivers' union a prerequisite to acquisition of a taxi-cab
driver's license, violated the applicant's right to freedom of
association."' Although the Court agreed with the
government's position that membership served the occupation-
al interests of its members, as well as provided for the public
interest, the Court decided this did not make the membership
"necessary in a democratic society," since other conceivable
methods existed to protect the same interests. 6
The provision under Article 11 protecting freedom of
peaceful assembly has been interpreted to include protection
for personal opinions. Recently, in Ezelin v. France,' the
Court decided the applicant's right to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly was violated when he was reprimanded under the
French Bar Council's professional rules of conduct for partici-
pating in a demonstration against two judgments during which
graffiti was painted on buildings and insulting remarks were
made about the judiciary.
Freedom of association can also be interpreted to include
intimate association with whomever one chooses. The Europe-
an case law has not been very expansive in defining which
other types of associations are protected, since nearly all of the
cases have involved trade unions and other economic group-
ings.' In the United States, however, the right to intimate
association was introduced in 1980 and was defined as "a close
and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some
significant way comparable to a marriage or family relation-
ship.' 2 9 This freedom requires "a serious search for justifica-
tions by the state for any significant impairment of... inti-
mate association."' 0 The right to freedom of intimate associa-
tion was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984 in
224. 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
225. Id. at 12, 20.
226. Id. at 18.
227. 202 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 6, 11, 24 (1991).
228. Nevertheless, although the United Kingdom's common law offense of con-
spiracy to corrupt public morals was unsuccessfully challenged under Article 11,
the Commission stressed that the law should not be applied to criminalize the
"mere existence" of homosexual advocacy groups. Y v. United Kingdom, App. No.
7525/76, 11 Eur. Comm'n HR. Dec. & Rep. 130-31 (1978).
229. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
629 (1980).
230. Id. at 627.
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Roberts v. United States JayceesY The Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the judiciary must "afford the... preservation of
certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State." 2 The degree of that judicial protection would depend
on where the particular relationship existed along the spec-
trum from the most intimate to the most detached. That point
would be determined by looking at numerous relevant factors
including size, purpose, selectivity, and congeniality.'
A complainant can use the same ideology to arguethat
sodomy statutes violate his freedom of intimate association
since they interfere with his right to form a highly personal
and intimate relationship. The member state must then at-
tempt to argue that its action is justified by the limitations on
freedom of association in Article 11(2).' However, the Court
has already ruled these are narrowly constructed restrictions
which must be narrowly tailored to a legitimate goal pur-
sued.' Alternatively, the complainant can argue that by lim-
iting his right to freedom of association without similarly re-
stricting the rights of heterosexuals, Article 14 has been
breached. 6
It is clear that freedom of association can and must be
expanded to recognize social and intimate relationships, as
well as economic and financial ones. By recognizing that the
freedom of association protects homosexual relationships, the
Council would be similarly recognizing the goals of self-realiza-
tion and self-identity for all people within the member states.
CONCLUSION
The Council of Europe's legal system must begin to adopt
and utilize another method for the invalidation of sodomy
statutes and for the recognition of lesbian and gay relation-
ships in order to best achieve the ideals and goals of the Con-
231. 468 U.s. 609 (1984).
232. Id. at 618.
233. Id. at 620.
234. For text of Article 11(2), see supra text accompanying note 48.
235. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21
(1981); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. U.R. (ser. A) at 22-23 (1976).
236. For an analysis of how Article 14 can be used in conjunction with other
articles of the Convention to establish a violation of the Convention, see supra
notes 203-17 and accompanying text.
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vention, namely the maintenance and security of fundamental
freedoms for all people within the member states. While the
Convention has been used to protect homosexual activity with-
in the limited private realm, the Commission and the Court
have ignored other important aspects of the lives of lesbian
and gay persons. In fact, the Convention's explicitly stated
mission of protecting the human rights and fundamental free-
doms of all people will be achieved only after the Commission
and the Court recognize the freedom of expression, freedom of
intimate association, and right to autonomy of many lesbian
and gay persons are violated by even unenforced sodomy stat-
utes. Instead, by continuously depending on traditional, out-
dated notions of privacy, the Court is constantly jeopardizing
the stable and significant relationships of lesbian and gay
persons within the member states, by failing to recognize their
fundamental rights outside of the closet in which the court has
locked them.
Clarice B. Rabinowitz
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